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Item exchange is becoming popular in many online community systems, e.g. on-
line games and social network web sites. Traditional manual search for possible
exchange pairs is neither ecient nor eective. Automatic exchange pairing is in-
creasingly important in such community systems, and can potentially lead to new
business opportunities. To facilitate item exchange, each user in the system is en-
titled to list some items he/she no longer needs, as well as some required items
he/she is seeking for. Given the values of all items, an exchange between two users
is eligible if 1) they both have some unneeded items the other one wants, and 2)
the exchange items from both sides are approximately of the same total value. To
eciently support exchange recommendation with frequent updates on the listed
items, new data structures are proposed in this thesis to maintain promising ex-
change pairs for each user. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data
sets are conducted to evaluate our proposed solutions.
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Item exchange is becoming popular and widely supported in more and more online
community systems, e.g. online games and social network web sites. For example,
Frontier Ville, one of the most popular farming games with millions of players,
every individual player only owns limited types of resources. To nish the tasks
in the game, the players can only resort to their online neighborhood for resource
exchanges [1]. Due to the lack of eective channel, most of the players are now
relying on the online forum to look for the exchange poster., posting the unneed-
ed and wishing items to attract other users meeting the exchange requirements.
While the items for exchange in online games are usually virtual objects, there are
also some emerging web sites dedicated to the exchange services on second-hand
commodities. Shede [6], for example, is a quick-growing internet-based product
exchange platform in China, reaching millions of transactions every year. Similar
web sites have also emerged in other countries, e.g. UK [5], Singapore [2] et al.
However, the users on the platform are only able to nd matching exchange parties
by browsing or searching with keywords in the system. Despite the huge potential
value of the exchange market, there remains a huge gap between the increasing
demands and the techniques supporting automatic exchange pairing.
2In this thesis, we aim to bridge this gap with an eective and ecient mechanis-
m to support automatic exchange recommendations in large online communities.
Generally speaking, a group of candidate exchanges are maintained and displayed
to each user in the system, suggesting the most benecial exchanges to them. The
problem of online exchange recommendation is challenging for two reasons. First,
it is important to design a reasonable and eective exchange model, on which all
users in the system are willing to follow. Second, a system, which can keep user
updated with the most recent and acceptable exchange options and handle massive
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Figure 1.1: Example of transaction in CSEM
To model the behaviors and requirements of the users in the community system
[21], some online exchange models have been proposed. The recent study in [7], for
example, proposed a Circular Single-item Exchange Model (CSEM). Specically,
given the users in the community, an exchange ring is eligible if there is a circle of
3users fu1 ! u2 ! : : : um ! u1g that each user ui in the ring receives a required item
from the previous user and gives an unneeded item to the successive user. Despite of
the successes of CSEM in kidney exchange problem [10], this model is not applicable
in online community systems for two reasons. First, CSEM does not consider the
values of the items. The exchange becomes unacceptable to some of the users in the
transaction, if he/she is asked to give up valuable items and only gets some cheap
items in return. Second, single-item constraint between any consecutive users in
the circle limits eciencies of online exchanges. Due to the complicated protocol of
CSEM, each transaction is committed only after all involved parties agree with the
deal. The expected waiting time for each transaction is unacceptably long in online
communities. In Figure 1.1, we present an example to illustrate the drawbacks of
CSEM. In this example, there are three users in the system, fu1; u2; u3g, whose
wishing items and unneeded items are listed in the the rows respectively. Based on
the protocol of CSEM, one plausible exchange is a three-user circle, I1 from u1 to
u2, I2 from u3 to u1 and I5 from u2 to u3, as is shown with the arrows in Figure
1.1. This transaction is not satisfactory with u2, since I5 is worth 100$ while I1's
price is only 10$.
In this thesis, we present a new exchange model, called Binary Value-based
Exchange Model (BVEM). In BVEM, each exchange is run between two users in
the community. An exchange is eligible, if and only if the exchanged items from
both sides are approximately of the same total value. Recall the example in Figure
1.1, a better exchange option between u2 and u3 is thus shown in Figure 1.2. In
this transaction, u2 gives two items I4 and I5 at total value at $180, while u3 gives a
single item I6 at value 170$. The dierence between the exchange pair is only 10$,
or 5.9% of the counterpart. This turns out to be a fair and reasonable deal for both
users. On the other hand, each exchange in BVEM only involves two users, which
4greatly simplies the exchange procedure. Both of these features make BVEM a
practical model for online exchange, especially in highly competitive environment
such as online games. To improve the exibility and usefulness of BVEM model
for online communities, we propose a new type of query, called Top-K Exchange
Recommendation. Upon the updates on the users' item lists, the system maintains
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Figure 1.2: Example of transaction in BVEM
Despite the enticing advantages of top-k exchange query under BVEM in terms
of eectiveness, scalability becomes an issue. Later in Chapter 3, we prove that
given a pair of users in the community, the problem of nding matching exchange
pair with the highest total value is NP-hard, with exponential complexity in term
of the number of items a user owns(Theorem 3.1). Fortunately, the size of the
item lists are usually bounded by some constant number in most of the community
systems, leading to acceptable computation cost on the search for the best exchange
5plan between two specied users. The problem tends to be more complicated if
the community system is highly dynamic, with frequent insertions and deletions on
the item lists of the users. To overcome these challenges on the implementation of
BVEM, we propose a new data structure to index the top-k optimal exchange pairs
for each user. Ecient updates on both insertions and deletions are well supported
by our data structure, to maintain the candidate top-k exchange pairs.
We summarize the contributions of the thesis as listed below:
1. We propose the Binary Value-based Exchange Model, capturing the require-
ments of online exchange behavior.
2. We design a new data structure for eective and ecient indexing on the
possible exchange pairs among the users.
3. We apply optimization techniques to improve the eciency of the proposed
index structure.
4. We present extensive experimental results to prove the usefulness of our pro-
posals.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews some
related work on online exchange models and methods. Chapter 3 presents the
problem denition and preliminary knowledge of our problem. Chapter 4 discusses
the solution to the Top-K Exchange Pair Monitoring Problem. Chapter 5 evaluates
our proposed solutions with synthetic data sets and Chapter 6 concludes this thesis.
6CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we survey related work from various areas. We rst review ex-
change and allocation models studied by computational economic communities and
database communities. Then we summarize existing research work in recommender
systems.
2.1 Related Exchange and Allocation Models
The exchange behaviour has attracted attention of both economists and computer
scientists. Economics researchers have proposed various economic models of the
matching, allocation and exchange of indivisible goods and resource (e.g. jobs,
houses and etc.)[51]. These economic models are mathematical representation of a
certain type of exchange activity. Based on these models, mathematical analysis
and computer simulation can be done to reveal the characteristics of the activi-
ty (e.g. if a equilibrium state exists in the exchange market). On another hand,
computer science researchers have also study the exchange model[8, 17]. They are
interested in eciently nding centralized exchange arrangement by computer sim-
ulation. Moreover, they develop exchange recommender system in large community
network based on their proposed exchange models.
7In the following subsections, we review several exchange models, including house
allocation and exchange models, kidney exchange models and the circular single-
item exchange model.
2.1.1 House Allocation and Exchange
In this subsection, we introduce two highly related problems about the house alloca-
tion and exchange: the house allocation problem and the housing market problem.
House Allocation
The house allocation problem is rst introduced in [27], in which a preference-
based allocation model is proposed and applied to the assignment of freshmen to
upper-class houses (residence halls) at Harvard College. Following [51], the house
allocation problem is dened as:
Denition 2.1. House Allocation Problem Given A, H and .
A = fa1; a2; : : : ; ang, referring to n agents who want to buy houses.
H = fh1; h2; : : : ; hng is n houses for sale.
= fa ja 2 Ag, and each a is a strict order relation, indicating a's preference
over houses. hi a hj means a prefer house hi rather than hj.
Output a matching, which is a bijection  : A 7! H. (a) is the house assigned
to a.
Although the problem is dened on house allocation, it can also be generalized
to allocation of indivisible resource/goods.
Let (A;H;) denotes the house allocation mechanism (algorithm), which takes
A, H and  as input and a matching as the output. When A and H are xed, for
simplicity we use () to indicate the algorithm.
8A matching  is Pareto-ecient, if there exists no other matching 0, such
that for all a 2 A, (a) 6a 0(a) and for some a 2 A, 0(a) a. Namely, in
a Pareto-ecient matching, no agent can be re-assigned a more preferable house
without other agents being made worse o. A house allocation algorithm (A;H;)
is Pareto-ecient, if for any input, it always outputs a Pareto-ecient matching.
An algorithm () is Strategy-proof, if for all agent a, there exists no a,
such that ( n a [ a) a (). That is, an agent can never be benetted by
telling their preference strategically rather than faithfully.
A family of mechanisms called serial dictatorships[48] solves the allocation
problems in a dictatorial manner. In these mechanisms, a priority ranking, which
is a bijection f : f1; 2; : : : ; ng 7! f1; 2; : : : ; ng, is assigned to all agents. Agents
are allocated houses one-by-one in the ascending order of f(a). Each agent is as-
signed with her/his most preferable house among the remaining houses that are not
assigned to a higher ranked agent. Algorithm 1 formally describe the mechanism.
Algorithm 1 Serial Dicatatorship(A;H;; f)
1: sort A in ascending order of f(a).
2: for a 2 A do
3: assign a with her top choice h in H.
4: remove h from H.
5: end for
In [9], it is proven that A matching mechanism is Pareto-ecient if and only if
it is a serial dictatorship, which means: 1) serial dictatorship mechanism is Pareto-
ecient and 2) for any Pareto-ecient matching , there is a priority ranking f
that induces the matching .
Housing Market
Next we consider a second model, which is an exchange-based model, called the
housing market[49]. This model diers from the house allocation in only one
9aspect: each house is initially owned by an agent. This ownership is called (initial)
endowment. Formally, the house market is dened as follow:
Denition 2.2. Housing Market Problem Given A, H, h and .
A = fa1; a2; : : : ; ang, referring to n agents who want to buy houses.
H is a set of n houses in the market.
h : A 7! H is a bijection between agents and houses. ha denote the house initially
owned by agent a.
= fa ja 2 Ag, and each a is a strict order relation, indicating a's preference
over houses. hi a hj means that a prefers house hi rather than hj.
Output a matching, which is the same as the output of house allocation problem..
Unlike the house allocation, in which a central planner arranges the allocation, a
housing market is an exchange market, where decentralized trading among agents
are done. Agents have the right to refuse a exchange proposal without benet.
Therefore, individually rational is introduced. A matching  is individually
rational, if for all agents a 2 A; ha 6a (a). That is, no agent trades her house for
a less preferable one. A mechanism is individually rational if it always outputs an
individually rational matching for each input.
A second concept that we introduce is competitive equilibrium. Let the price
vector be p = fphjh 2 Hg, where ph is the price of the house h. A competitive
equilibrium is a matching-price vector pair (; p), subject to:
 Budget Constraint p(a)  pha .
 Utility Maximization 8h 2 H, if ph  pha , h 6a (a).
The competitive equilibrium is a balanced market state, in which each agent owns
the most preferred house that she can aord. However, it is not immediately clear if
10
the competitive equilibrium exists for all housing markets. The theoretical analysis
of competitive equilibrium relies on another important concept called the core.
We say a coalition (subset) of agents B  A blocks a matching , if there
exists another matching , such that:
 8a 2 B; 9b 2 B such that (a) = hb,
 8a 2 B; (a) 6a (a),
 9a 2 B; (a) a (a).
In another word, a matching is blocked by a group of agents, if these agents benet
from excluding other agents and only trading within the group. A matching  is
in the core, if and only if it is blocked by no coalitions of agents. The core is a
stable market state. However, it is not apparent that the core exists. In [49], the
following theorem is proven, which shows the existence of the core and competitive
equilibrium in housing markets, and also reveals the connection between them.
Theorem 2.1. The core of a housing market is non-empty and there exists a core
matching that can be sustained as part of a competitive equilibrium.
In [49], a constructive method is used to prove the theorem. The authors
propose the David Gale's Top Trading Cycle algorithm, which nds the core
matching. It is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
In each iteration of the while-loop, a graph G is constructed. Its vertices corre-
spond to agents and houses. In G, each agent points to her most preferable house
and each house points to its initial owner. It is readily to prove that G contains at
least one cycle, and all cycles in G are non-intersecting. Therefore, we can safely
assign each agent in the cycle with her top choice, which is the node she points to
in the cycle. After removing these agents and their houses, the algorithm enters a
new iteration. It terminates until all agents are assigned a house.
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Algorithm 2 Gale's Top Trading Cycle(A;H; h;)
1: while A 6= ; do
2: Construct an empty directed graph G = (V;E).
3: Set V = A [H
4: For each a 2 A, E = E [ f(ha; a)g
5: For each a 2 A, let ha be a's current top choice, E = E [ f(a; ha)g
6: If a 2 A is in any graphic cycle, assign ha to it.
7: If an agent a is assigned a house, remove a from A and remove ha from H.
8: end while
Theorem 2.2. Output of Gale's Top Trading Cycle is a core matching, and is also
sustainable by a competitive equilibrium.
A competitive equilibrium price vector can be constructed as follow: 1) all
houses that are removed in a same iteration in Algorithm 2 are assigned with a
same price; 2) all houses that are removed in later iterations are assigned a price
lower than the current house. That is, the later a house is removed in the Algorithm
2, the lower its price is.
In [41], it is proven that if no agents is indierent between any houses (a is
a strict preference for any a 2 A), the core is always non-empty, contains exactly
one matching and is the unique matching that can be sustained at a competitive
equilibrium.
In [40], the core mechanism is also proven to be strategy-proof.
It is easy to see that the core mechanism also has several positive properties:
individually rational and Pareto-ecient and strategy-proof. In [32], a stronger
theorem shows that it is a dominating mechanism. That is, a mechanism is indi-
vidually rational, Pareto-ecient and strategy-proof for a housing market only if
it is core mechanism.
However, these good properties may not hold for a more complex model. In
[28], authors study a model in which there are Q types of goods(house). Each agent
owns exactly one good of each type. Exchange can be done only among the same
12
type of goods. Each agent has a strict utility score for each good. The overall utility
score of a Q-good combination is the sum of all Q utility scores. Agents pursuit
high utility by exchanging goods. In their economy model, the core maybe empty.
Moreover, the competitive equilibrium matching is proven to be in the core, but a
core is not suciently sustained at a competitive equilibrium. That is, the set of
competitive equilibrium matchings can be smaller than the core. In addition, there
is no mechanism that is individually rational, Pareto-ecient and strategy-proof.
2.1.2 Kidney Exchange
In this subsection, we consider an important application of exchange models, which
is the kidney exchange. Kidney exchange is a project aiming to improve the proba-
bility that a patient waiting for kidney transplanting nds a compatible donor and
shorten their waiting time. To adapt to the restriction imposed by the nature of
the problem, new models are developed and a new theory is constructed.
Background
Kidney transplanting is the organ transplant of a kidney into a patient with end-
stage renal disease. Since organ trading is illegal in many countries, donation
is the only source of kidneys in these countries. Depending on the source, the
donation can be classied as living donor and deceased donor. The living donors
are generally friends or relatives of a patient. These donors are only willing to
donate one of their kidneys to a designated patient.1 Deceased donor are assigned
according to a centralized priority mechanism in the US and Europe[51]. Based
on the mechanism, the patients are ordered in a waiting list. A donor kidney is
assigned to a selected patient based on a metric considering the degree of match,
1There exist Good Samaritan donors who donate their kidneys to strangers. However, the
number of these donors is small relative to the number of directed live donors[51].
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waiting time and other medical and fairness criteria.
However, the living donor may not be compatible with a patient. The com-
patibility test is conducted for each donor and patient. There are two kinds of
compatibility tests:
 Blood compatibility test. This test veries if the donor's blood is com-
patible with patient's blood. For example, in the ABO blood group, "A"
blood-type donor is blood-type compatible with "A" and "AB" blood type
patient.
 Tissue compatibility test (or crossmatch test). This test examines the
human leukocyte antigen (HLA) in patient's and donor's DNA. The patient
and the donor are tissue type incompatible if the patient's blood contains
antibodies against donor's human leukocyte antigen (HLA) proteins.
Traditionally, incompatible donors are sent home. To better utilize them, kidney
exchange is applied. There are two ways of kidney exchange:
 List exchange List exchange allows exchange between an incompatible patient-
donor pair and the deceased donor waiting list. The donor's kidney can be
assigned to another compatible patient in the waiting list. In return, the
patient becomes the rst priority person in the waiting list.
 Paired exchange Paired exchange can be applied among multiple incompat-
ible patients-donor pairs. In paired exchange, a patient receives a transplant
from the donor of another pair, and his paired donor donates the kidney to
feasible patient of other pairs.
Moreover, besides medical compatibility which is crucial, the preference of pa-
tients and doctors are also important. Based on several factors, such as geographic
14
distance of the match, patients and doctors have a preference over the compatible
donors or even refuse exchange with some donors. This should also be considered
in the model.
Kidney exchange programs have been established in several countries, such as
the USA[3], the UK[4] and Romania[31].
Exchange Model
The general kidney exchange model is dened as follow:
Denition 2.3. Kidney Exchange Model A kidney exchange model consists of:
 a set of patients P = fp1; : : : ; png.
 a set of donors D = fd1; : : : ; dng.
 a set of donor-patient pairs f(d1; p1); : : : ; (dn; pn))g
 a set of compatible donors fD1; : : : ; Dng, where Di  D, indicating the donors
compatible with patient pi.
 a set of strict preference relations = f1; : : : ;ng. succi is an ordered
relation over Di [ fwg, denoting pi's preference over her compatible donors.
w refers to the patient's option to become the priority person in the deceased
waiting list in return of exchange her paired donor.
The output of the kidney exchange problem is a matching between D [ fwg
and P , indicating the assignment of donors or waiting list option to every patient.
A matching  is Pareto-ecient if there is no other matching  such that
all patients are assigned a donor in  no worse than in , and some patients are
assigned a donor in  better than in . A mechanism is Pareto-ecient if it always
output Pareto-ecient matching.
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A matching is individually rational if for each patient, the matched donor is
not worse than her paired-donor. A mechanism is individually rational if it always
selects an individually rational matching.
A mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent can be better o by strategically
rather truthfully reporting their preference and paired-donors.
In the remaining part of this subsection, we review the recent work on kidney
exchange models, including the general model with strict preference and its variants
with extra assumptions/restrictions.
Multi-way Kidney Exchanges with Strict Preference
In [43], the multi-way kidney exchange problem is studied. It follows the denition
2.3, which means:
 List exchanges are allowed.
 Paired exchanges are allowed. The exchange cycle can be of any length.
 Each patient has a strict preference over the donors. That is, no two donors
are equally preferable to a patient.
In [43], the top trading cycles and chains(TTCC) algorithm is proposed
to solve the problem. Similar to Gale's top trading cycles algorithm, this algorithm
construct a directed graph from the input following the steps:
 create a vertex for each patient, each donor and the waiting list option w.
 add an edge from each patient's donor to the patient.
 add an edge from each patient to her most preferable kidney. If no compatible
kidney is there, point the patient to w.
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In this graph, a w-chain is dened as a path starting with a donor and end with
the w. It is easy to prove that there exists at least a w-chain if no cycle exists.
Based on this, TTCC works as shown in Algorithm 3. In each iteration, it nds
a w-chain or a cycle and removes it. In line 8, a chain selection rules is used. It
determines which w-chain to choose. Moreover, in line 11, it also determines if the
"tail donor", which is the donor staring the w-chain, should be removed or kept
for the remaining iteration. If the tail donor is removed, it is nally assigned to
the deceased waiting list and not participates in the paired exchange. Depending
on dierent chain selection rules, TTCC outputs dierent matchings. We list a few
candidate rules below:
Algorithm 3 TTCC algorithm
1: while not all patients are assigned a donor/waiting list do
2: Construct a graph G based on current patients and donors.
3: while there exists a graphic cycle in G do
4: assign each patients in the cycle with the donor that she points to.
5: remove the patients and donors in the cycle.
6: end while
7: if there exits a w-chain then
8: select a w-chain according to a chain selection rule.
9: assign each patient in the w-chain with the donor/waiting list that she
points to.
10: remove the patients and donors in the w-chain (do not remove w).




1. Select the minimal w-chain and remove the tail donor.
2. Select the longest w-chain and remove the tail donor.
3. Select the longest w-chain and keep the tail donor.
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4. Assign a priority ranking to the patient-donor pairs (as in the serail dictator-
ships). Select the w-chain starting with the highest ranked pair and remove
the tail donor.
5. Assign a priority ranking to the patient-donor pairs. Select the w-chain star-
ing with the highest ranked pair and keep the tail donor.
In [43], authors show that dierent rules result in dierent characteristics:
Theorem 2.3. If the w-chain selection rules keep the tail donor, the induced TTCC
algorithm is Pareto-ecient.
Theorem 2.4. The TTCC algorithm induced by rule 1, 4 or 5 is strategy-proof.
The TTCC algorithm induced by rule 2 or 3 is not strategy-proof.
Two-Way Paired Exchanges with 0-1 Preferences
Pervious we consider the kidney exchange with unlimited cycle/chain length. How-
ever, it is suggested that the pairwise exchange with 0-1 preferences is a more prac-
ticable solution[42]. That is, each exchange involves only two patient-donor pairs,
and the patients and doctors are indierent among compatible donors. This is
because 1) all transplantations in an exchange must be carried out simultaneously,
in case that a donor would back out after her paired-patient receives a transplan-
tation, and 2) in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have
about equal graft survival probabilities regardless of the closeness of tissue types
between the patient and the donor[26].
Based on this, we can simplify the exchange model:
Denition 2.4. Two-Way Kidney Exchanges Problem Given (P;R):
 A set of patient-donor pairs P = fp1; : : : ; png.2
2In the remaining of this section, we may also use pi to refer to a patient in the pair if no
ambiguity is created.
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 A mutually compatible relation R  P P . (pi; pj) 2 R if and only if pi's
patient is compatible with pj's donor and vice versa.
Output a matching M  R, such that no patient-donor pair appear in M more
than once.
For a given input, we deneM as the set of all feasible matchings. For the sake
of fairness, we are interested in the stochastic output of this problem. A lottery
 is dened as a probability distribution over all feasible matchings  = ()2M.
The utility of a patient pi under a lottery  is the probability that the patient
gets a transplant. It is denoted as ui(). The utility prole of a lottery  is
u() = fu1(); : : : ; un()g.
Lottery often assigns inequable probability to patients, which is unfair to some
patients. We say a utility prole u() is Lorenz-dominant if for any k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng,
the sum of utilities of the k most unfortunate (i.e. lowest utility) patients is high-
est among all feasible utility prole of any lotteries. Lorenz-dominance identify the
utility prole has the least possible inequality of the utility.
A matching is Pareto-ecient if there is no other matching that makes some
patients strictly better o without making any patient worse o. A lottery is
ex-post ecient if and only if it only assigns non-zero probability to the Pareto-
ecient matching. A lottery is ex-ante ecient if there is no other lottery that
makes some patients strictly better o (i.e. higher utility) without making any
patient worse o.
In [42], two lemmas are proven:
Lemma 2.1. The same number of patients are matched in each Pareto-ecient
matching. The number is also maximum among all matchings.
Lemma 2.2. A lottery is ex-ante ecient if and only if it is ex-post ecient.
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The rst lemma reveals that nding Pareto-ecient matching is equivalent to
nding the maximum matching in the graph theory. The second lemma shows that
ex-ante eciency is equivalent to ex-post ecient for the two-way kidney exchanges
problem.
In [42], a deterministic algorithm and a lottery algorithm is proposed. The
deterministic algorithm achieves the Pareto-eciency and strategy-proofness. The
lottery algorithm is Pareto-ecient and strategy-proof, and its utility prole is
always Lorenz-dominant.
Multi-way Paired Exchange with Non-strict Preference
As mentioned earlier, paired exchange with 0-1 preference and short exchange cycle
is more practicable. However, it is clear that allowing longer exchange cycle can
potentially nd paired exchange for more patients. In [44], the authors examined
the size of the multi-way exchange in order to nd out what has been lost in two-
way paired exchange. In their paper, they consider the 2-, 3- and 4-way paired
exchange with 0-1 preference. In addition, there are three assumptions:
 Upper Bound Assumption. No patients are tissue type incompatible.
Only ABO blood type compatibility is considered.
 Large Population of Incompatible Patient-Donor Pairs. Let X-Y pair
denotes a patient with blood type X and a donor with a blood type Y. We
assume that there is an arbitrary many number of O-A, O-B, O-AB, A-AB
and B-AB type pairs.
 There is no A-A pair or there are at least two of them. The same is also true
for each of the types B-B, AB-AB and O-O.
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Base on these assumptions, they solve the theoretical upper bounds of the
number of patients that are covered by 2-, 2&3-, 2&3&4-way paired exchanges
respectively. Moreover, the following theorem shows that allowing cycle length
longer than four is not necessary under their assumptions:
Theorem 2.5. Consider a kidney exchange problem for which the assumptions
above hold and let  be any maximum matching without restriction on the exchange
cycle length. Then there exists a maximal matching  that consists only of two-,
three- and four-way exchanges, under which the same set of patients benets from
exchange as in matching .
In [50], authors synthesize the kidney exchange data based on national recipi-
ent characteristics with considering both blood-type and tissue-type compatibility.
They compare their simulation results with the theoretical upper bounds in [44].
The result shows that although the upper bounds are developed with ignoring the
tissue-type compatibility, it is still predictive. Moreover, two-, three- and four-way
exchanges virtually achieve all the possible gains from unrestricted exchanges when
the population size is large. This veries the Theorem 2.5.
Hardness of Finding Multi-way Kidney Exchange
There are other research been done on the exchange algorithm analysis. The TTCC
algorithm does not take cycle length into consideration. In [17], a modied exchange
model is proposed to overcome this problem. It diers from Denition 2.3 in the
below respects:
 No deceased list exchange is allowed. Only paired exchanges are considered.
Therefore, the result matching can be described by a permutation , (i)
indicating the donor d(i) is assigned to pi.
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 Patients' actual preference is based on the (donor, cycle length) pairs. The
cycle length is the length of the exchange cycle that the patient attends in
the current permutation. A patient pi prefers (dj; N) than (dk;M) if:
{ dj i dk, or
{ dj i dk and N < M .
That is, the patient prefers a smaller cycle if the donors are indierent.
Like the housing market, a coalition (subset) of patients block a matching  if
all of them can be made weakly better o and some of them can be made strictly
better o by only exchange with each other. The core of the kidney exchange is
the set of matchings that are not blocked by any coalition. A patient pi is said to
be covered by a matching  if (pi) 6= di (i.e. she receives a compatible donor).
It is interesting that if we can nd a core matching that covers as many as
possible patients. In [17], authors dene the deterministic problem below:
Denition 2.5. MAX-COVER-KE For a kidney exchange problem, determine
if a matching  covers the maximum number of patients.
They prove the problem is not only NP-complete, but also inapproximable.
Theorem 2.6. MAX-COVER-KE is not approximable within n1  for any  > 0
unless P=NP.
In [20], the authors study the cycle length of a core matching. They are inter-
ested in the problems that if the cycle length can be shorten. In a matching ,
they dene C(pi) as the length of the exchange cycle that pi take part in. If pi
fails to get a compatible donor in , C(pi) = +1.
We can easily adapt the top trading cycle algorithm (Algortihm 2) to paired
kidney exchange with strict preference (but cycle length is not considered). That
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is, construct a graph with patients and donors being the vertices; let each patient
point to her top choice donor (points to her paired donor if there is no compatible
donor) and each donor points to her paired patient. Then cycles are iteratively
removed from the graph and exchange cycles are formed.
In [20], the following problems are proven to be NP-Complete:
 ALL-SHORTER-CYCLE-KE For a kidney exchange problem with strict
preference, determining if there is a matching  in the core, such that C(pi) <
CTTC(pi) for all pi 2 P . Here TTC denotes the matching given by top trading
cycle algorithm.
 3-CYCLE-KE For a kidney exchange problem with strict preference, de-
termining if there is a matching  in the core, such that C(pi)  3 for all
pi 2 P .
 FULL-COVER-KE For a kidney exchange problem with strict preference,
determining if there is a matching  in the core, such that (pi) 6= di (i.e. the
patient is assigned a compatible donor) for all pi 2 P .
2.1.3 Circular Single-item Exchange Model
In this subsection, we introduce the Circular Single-item Exchange Model (CSEM),
which is closely related to the kidney exchange model that we introduce in the last
subsection. This model is proposed in [8]. In this subsection, all stated results are
from this paper unless otherwise noted.
This model is based on a real-life application, which is also the main problem
of this thesis: users want to trade their unneeded goods for what they want in an
online social network. There are two CSEM models, a deterministic model called
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simple exchange markets and its probabilistic version is called probabilistic
exchange markets.
The simple exchange markets assume that each user has two lists: an item list
and a wish list. The item list contains all her unneeded items, which are ready
to be given away. The wish list contains all her wanted items, which are the items
that she needs. The formal denition is given below:
Denition 2.6. Simple Exchange Markets The simple exchange market is a
tuple (U; I; S;W ).
 U = fu1; : : : ; ung is the set of users in the market.
 I = fi1; : : : ; img is the set of items in the market.
 S = fSuju 2 Ug is the set of unneeded item lists of users. Su  I is the set
of items that unneeded by user u.
 W = fWuju 2 Ug is the set of wish lists of users. Wu  I is the set of wanted
items of user u.
The elementary exchange behaviour in the market is the swap, denoted as
[(u; i); (v; j)], subject to i 2 Su\Wv and j 2 Sv \Wu. It means that user u use the
item i to trade user v's item j. The swap cover based on a simple exchange market
is a set of swaps C. It is conict-free if 8u; i 2 Su, swap [(u; i); (; )] appears at
most once in C, where the rst  is any other user v 6= u and the second  is any
item. For example, if [(u; i); (v; j)] and [(u; i); (w; k)] appear together, a conict is
caused since it is not feasible for u to give item i to two users.
The problem is to nd a conict-free swap to maximize the number of items
being exchanged. Its decision problem is dened as following:
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Denition 2.7. SimpleMarket Given a simple exchange market (U; I; S;W ),
determine if there exists a conict-free swap cover with number of items exchanged
 K.
Unfortunately, the problem is NP-hard even in the simple exchange market:
Theorem 2.7. SimpleMarket is NP-Complete.
The next model we consider is the probabilistic exchange markets. This model
improve the simple exchange market by adding a probability setting to describe the
social connection and personal income/outcome matching. Formally, this model is
dened as below:
Denition 2.8. Probabilistic Exchange Markets The simple exchange market
is a tuple (U; I; S;W; Pu(v); Qu(i; j)).
 U = fu1; : : : ; ung is the set of users in the market.
 I = fi1; : : : ; img is the set of items in the market.
 S = fSuju 2 Ug is the set of unneeded item lists of users. Su  I is the set
of items that unneeded by user u.
 W = fWuju 2 Ug is the set of wish lists of users. Wu  I is the set of wanted
items of user u.
 Pu(v) denote the probability that u is willing to do exchange with v.
 Qu(i; j), where i 2 Su and j 2 Wu, denotes the probability that u is willing to
exchange item i with item j.
We also consider a more complex exchange behaviour, the cycle exchange. The
cycle exchange, denoted as [(u1; i1); (u2; i2); : : : ; (ul; il)], means that u1 gives item
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i1 to u2, and u2 gives i2 to u3, : : : , ul gives il to u1. The probability of a cycle being
realized is:
Pu1(u2)Qu1(i1; il) Pu2(u3)Qu2(i2; i1) : : : Pul(u1)Qul(il; il 1)
In practice, we may wish to limit the length of cycles to maximum of k. We
dene the cycle cover as a conict-free set C of cycle exchanges, meaning that any
pair (u; i) appears at most once in all exchanges in C. Our aim is to nd a cycle
cover which maximize the expected number of items being exchanged. Therefore
we dene the ProbMarket problem:
Denition 2.9. ProbMarket Given a probabilistic exchange market (U; I; S;W;
Pu(v); Qu(i; j)), determine if there exists a conict-free cycle cover whose expected
number of items exchanged  K.
Not surprisingly, this is also an NP-Complete problem:
Theorem 2.8. ProbMarket is NP-Complete.
The simple/probabilistic exchange markets can be represented as a graph G.
For each user u, we create one node in G labeled u. For each item i 2 Su \Wv,
we create a directed edge from u to v labeled i. A swap is a graphic cycle of
length 2. An exchange cycle shorter than k is a graphic cycle of length up to k.
A conict-free cycle(swap) cover, is a set of cycles (swaps) with no common edges.
In the simple exchange markets, the weight of a cycle is the number edges in it. In
the probabilistic exchange markets, the weight of a cycle is the expected number
of elements exchanged in the cycle based on Pu(v) and Qu(i; j). The problem of
nding a conict-free cycle (swap) cover with length limitation k becomes nding
a conict-free cycle (swap) cover shorter than k with maximum sum of weights in
the graph.
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Based on the graph representation, four dierent algorithms are designed to
nd the conict-free cycle cover in the graph:
 Maximal Algorithm This algorithm repeatedly runs a breath rst search
from a randomly selected node, nd a new cycle and remove the cycle from
the graph until no cycle exists in the graph. Then the cycles found in these
iterations form a conict-free cover. The algorithm runs forM rounds andM
random conict-free cycle covers are found. The one with maximum weight
is selected as the result.
 Greedy Algorithm This algorithm repeatedly nds the maximum weighted
cycle in the current graph and remove it until no cycle exists in the graph. The
cycles found in these iterations form a conict-free cover, which is returned
as the result.
 Local Search Algorithm This algorithm starts with an empty conict-free
cover. It iteratively nds a random cycle that is not ever picked, tries to add
it into the current cover and remove any existing cycles with conict. If the
new cover is better than the current cover, then the current cover is replaced
with the new cover. The algorithm stops until no improvement can be made
and the current cover is returned as the result.
 Greedy/Local Search Algorithm This algorithm diers from local search
algorithm in only one respect: instead of starting with an empty cover, the
greedy/local search algorithm starts with an initial cover which is the output
of the greedy algorithm. Then local search improvement is done like the local
search algorithm.
Based on analysis in [8], maximal algorithm has no obvious approximation
bound; greedy algorithm is a 2k-approximation; local search algorithm is a 2k  1-
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approximation; greedy/local search algorithm is a 2(2k+1)=3-approximation. The
empirical study shows that the accuracy of maximal algorithm has comparable to
that of other algorithms.
2.1.4 Overview of Exchange Models
In this subsection, we summarize the models that we previously introduced and
show the relationships among them.
All the models can be generally classied as allocation models and exchange
models. In the allocation model, there is no initial connection between the agents
(patients / users) and resources (kidneys / items), while in the exchange models
the initial endowments play an important role in the problem. In all the models
that we introduce, the house allocation is the only allocation model and the other
models are the exchange model.
Although the models are designed for various purposes, some of the models
are closely related. The house marketing and the paired kidney exchange with
strict preference are equivalent. By substituting "patient" for "agent" and "donor"
for "house", the house marketing problem becomes the paired kidney exchange
problem. Moreover, as explained in [8], the CSEM can also be applied on multi-
way kidney exchange problem with 0-1 preference.
A centralized algorithm which outputs the matching between agents and re-
sources is called a mechanism. According to the nature of the market, good mech-
anism needs to be Pareto-ecient and strategy-proof. For exchange models, it is
interesting to nd individual rational matching, the core matching or a competitive
equilibrium3. The top trading cycle, which is a mechanism applied on both house
marketing and paired exchange with strict preference, achieves Pareto-ecient and
3We are not interested in nding competitive equilibrium for kidney exchange because price
the kidney is illegal.
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strategy-proof and always outputs a matching in the core. When the list kidney
exchange is allowed, a variant of the top trading cycle, called the TTCC, is used
and also achieves all the good properties when the proper chain selection rule is
used.
Fairness is another concern. For house allocation, any Pareto-ecient mecha-
nism is proven to be dictatorship, which means no mechanism is absolutely fair. For
two-way paired kidney exchange with 0-1 preference, lottery mechanism is used to
ensure the fairness. Lorenz-dominance denes the fairest lottery mechanism, and
this mechanism is found for two-way kidney exchange with 0-1 preference.
Other research focuses on the global utility. For example, multi-way kidney
exchange is proposed to maximize the patients been covered. However, several
problems on nding multi-way kidney exchange are proven to be NP-complete or
even inapproximable. In [8], the algorithms also aim at maximizing the global
number of item exchanged, but the other properties such as strategy-proofness,
competitive equilibrium and the core are not considered.
2.2 Recommender System
The recommender system is a broad term describing any system that produces
individually recommendations as output or has the eect of guiding the user in
a personalized way to interesting or useful objects in a large space of possible
options[19]. It originates from extensive work in dierent areas, such as cogni-
tive science[39], approximation theory[46], information retrieval[45] and forecasting
theories[13]. From mid 1990's, it becomes an independent research area focusing
on the recommendation problems which are based on ratings structure. The most
common problem in the recommender system is to suggest a list of items (e.g.
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restaurant, house and movie) or social element (e.g. friend, event or group) which
the user might like most. This problem is often reduced to predict the "rating" or
"preference" that a user would give to the item[11]. Formally speaking, there is a
function describing the rating that users would give to items:
R : USER ITEM 7! RATING (2.1)
Here the USER is the set of users in the system (e.g. the buyer in an online
store), and the ITEM is the set of all possible items that can be recommended.
The RATING is a totally ordered set denoting the set of possible ratings that a
user can give to an item. Possible ratings can be binary (e.g. like/dislike), discrete
values (e.g. one to ve stars) or continuous real values. Based on R, we could
recommend one item iu for each user u which maximizes the rating function:
iu = argmaxi2IR(u; iu)
Sometimes, instead of choosing only one item, k items are required for each user.
This is also known as the top-k recommendation[47].
The central problem of recommender system is that the rating function R is
not fully known to the system. The system only knows the ratings that users have
already given to the items. This means the recommender system must predict the
function R, based on the existing known ratings and other background information,
such as user proles, purchase histories and search logs.
According to [11], the recommender system can be classied into the following
categories based on the techniques used:
 Content-based Recommendation [36, 30, 34]The user is recommended
items solely based on the content of items. The content of an item is the
30
information describing the item. For example, in a movie recommender sys-
tem, a movie's content contains its title, genre, description and etc; in a news
recommender system, the headline and body are the content belonging to a
piece of news. A typical content-based recommender system works as follow:
1. Process content of items and construct a representation for content of
each item. For example, a text-based item (e.g. web page, book and
news) can be represented as some informative words[36] or represented
as a vector[30, 34, 14].
2. Learn a model for each user based on her past feedbacks and the item's
content. The model is learned from the past ratings that the users give to
the items. Various IR and machine learning techniques are employed to
learn the model, including the Rocchio's algorithm[30, 36, 14], Bayesian
classier[36, 34], nearest neighbor algorithm[36], PEBLS[36], Decision
trees[36] and neural nets[36].
3. Predict users' rating of unseen items based on the model and recommend
to the users.
The content-based recommendation has a few limitations: 1) it only works
well when the content of items are easily analyzed by a computer (e.g. text).
It is hard to be applied on multimedia data, such as image, audio and video. 2)
The recommendation can be over-specialized. The recommendations highly
rely on what the user rated in the past. As a result, the recommendations
are over-focused on a small cluster. It is not able to bring the user some
interesting options that she has never tried. For example, a user never reads
science ction will never be recommended with any science ction book, no
matter how popular the book is. 3) New users with few ratings may not get
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high-quality recommendations. The system can accurately model the user's
preference only after sucient ratings are made.
 Collaborative Recommendation The user is recommended items purely
based on what other people with similar preference chose in the past. In
collaborative recommender system, the content of the item is not important.
The score is only predicted based on how other users rate the item. There
are two classes of collaborative ltering methods: the memory-based algo-
rithm and the model-based algorithm.[18] The memory-based algorithm
predicts the rating directly from the entire database.[38, 18, 25, 35] To pre-
dict the rating for a user, the system nd some other (usually top-K) users
that are similar to the current user. These users are called neighbours. The
ratings of neighbours are aggregated to generate the prediction of the current
user. Unlike the memory-based algorithm, the model-based algorithm rstly
learns a model using the database collection with data mining and machine
learning techniques.[18, 35, 15, 29, 33] Then the ratings are predicted by
applying the model. Various learning techniques are used for collaborative
recommendation. In [15], the problem is modeled as a classication problem
and classication algorithms such as the Singular Vector Decomposition are
used. In [33], the Latent Dirichlet Allocation is used to model the problem
and EM algorithm is used for model tting. In [29], authors try to embed the
users' interest and items' features into a high dimensional linear space and
matrix factorization techniques are used to nd the embedding. No matter
which approach is used, a pure collaborative recommender system only con-
siders the rating relationship between the users and the items. The content
of an item is not used while nding the neighbours and building the model.
The collaborative recommendation also has its own limitations: 1) new items,
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which have very few ratings, may not be recommended to users, no matter
how high its rating is and how it ts a user's need. 2) New users with very
few ratings may not get correct recommendation. This limitation also exists
in content-based recommendation. 3) Critical mass of users is needed for
high-quality recommendation. For example, a user with very odd taste may
not get accurate recommendation because there is no other user with similar
taste as her.
 Hybrid Approaches These methods combines both content-based and col-
laborative recommendation. The hybrid approach helps to overcome the lim-
itations in content-based and collaborative recommendation. There are four
ways to combine the two approaches:
1. Implementing collaborative and content-based methods as two individu-
al model and making prediction by combining their output. For example,
[22] use a linear combination. The weight assigned to both methods are
adjusted according to the user feedback. [16] uses a switching-based com-
bination. While predicting rate for an unseen item, the system switch to
content-based or collaborative recommender according to the pre-dened
rule.
2. Adding content-based features to collaborative modules. For example, in
[37], a "collaborative via content" approach is used. It creates content-
based prole for each user and uses it to calculate correlation between
users. Therefore, two users are considered as similar users not only if
they have rated the same item, but also if they have rated similar items
based on content.
3. Adding collaborative features to content-base models. For example, in
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[24] the authors consider using the social connection between users to
adjust the feature weighting in vector-based representation of item con-
tent.
4. Building a single model considering the content and collaboration simul-
taneously. For example, in [12] a statistic model considering the user
proles and the item characteristics is proposed. The model is trained
using Markov chain Monte Carlo method with the past rating data.
As a research area, the recommender system has been extensively studied and
various techniques are proposed. However, the item-exchange recommender system
proposed in this thesis is not a typical recommender system. Like the traditional
recommender system, our system also aims at recommending users with items that
maximize their utility function. But the main goal of our system is not predicting
the hidden utility function, but computing it eciently. Therefore, the technique
used in this thesis is not related to a traditional recommender system. For this
reason, we do not survey all the recommender system techniques.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, we review the existing research work related to this thesis. In
the rst part of this chapter, we survey the exchange economic models. These
exchange models are mathematical tools for analysis and simulation of a certain
type of exchange activities. We review related work on the house allocation and
exchange models, kidney exchange models and the CSEM. We summarize the pro-
posed models, algorithm/mechanisms and their characteristics from both economics
and computer science community. In the second part of this chapter, we review
some research work on the recommender system. The recommender system pro-
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vides users with personalized suggest on items. The major challenge of recom-
mender system is to predict a hidden preference function based on the past ratings
that users have given to the items. The techniques are classied as three types: the
content-based, collaborative and the hybrid approach. The content-based methods
only make recommendation based on the content of item (e.g. description, title),
while the collaborative methods only recommend based on other users' choices.
The hybrid method combines the two methods to overcome some limitation in





In this chapter, we propose the Binary Value-based Exchange Model (BVEM),
which models the basic user exchange bahaviour in the community system. Based
on BVEM, we dene the Top-K Exchange Pair Monitoring Problem, which is the
major problem we should solve in our recommendation system. Then we prove the
problem is NP-hard.
3.1 Problem Denition
In the community system, we assume that there are n users U = fu1; u2; : : : ; ung,
and m items O = fI1; I2; : : : ; Img. Each user ui has two item lists, the unneeded
item list Li and the wish list Wi. Each item Ij is labelled with a tag vj as its public
price. Given a group of items O0  O, the value of the item set is the sum on the
prices of all items in O0, i.e. V (O0) =
P
Ij2O0 vj. In the example for Figure 1.1 and
Figure 1.2, the value of the item set V (fI1; I2; I3g) =$100 according to the price
list in the gures.
In this thesis, we adopt the Binary Value-based Exchange Model as the under-
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lying exchange model in the community system. Given two users ui and ul, as well
as two item sets Si  Li and Sl  Ll, an exchange transaction E = (ui; ul; Si; Sl)
represents the deal that ui gives all items in Si to ul and receives Sl in return.
The gain of the exchange E for user ui is measured by the total value of the items
he receives after the exchange, i.e. G(E; ui) = V (Sl). Similarly, the gain of user
ul is G(E; ul) = V (Si). This exchange is eligible under BVEM with relaxation
parameter  (0 <   1), which follows the formal denition below.
Denition 3.1. Eligible Exchange Pair
The exchange transaction E = (ui; ul; Si; Sl) is eligible, if it satises 1) Item
matching condition: Si  Wl and Sl  Wi; and 2) Value matching condition:
V (Si)  V (Sl)   1V (Si).
Assuming that all users in the system are rational, each user ui always wants
to maximize his gain in the exchanges with other users. In the following, we prove
the existence of a unique optimal exchange among all exchanges between ui and
ul, maximizing both of their gains.
Lemma 3.1. For any pair of users, ui and ul, there exists a dominating exchange
pair E = (ui; ul; Si; Sl) such that for any E
0 = (ui; ul; S 0i; S
0
l) the following two
events can never happen: 1) G(E 0; ui) > G(E; ui), or 2) E(E 0; ul) > G(E; ul).
Proof. We prove this lemma by construction and contradiction. We order all eligible
exchange pairs with non-increasing order on G(E; ui). For all exchange pairs with
exactly the maximal gain for ui, we further nd the unique exchange pair E =
(ui; ul; Si; Sl) by maximizing the gain for ul. If E does not satisfy the condition in
the lemma, there are two possible cases. In the rst case, there exists an exchange
pair E 0 that G(E 0; ui) > G(E; ui). Depending on our construction method, this
situation can never occur. In the second case, ul has a better option with higher gain
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in E 0 = (ui; ul; S 0i; S
0
l), i.e. G(E
0; ul) = V (S 0i) > G(E; ul) = V (Si). If this happens,
we will show in the following that E 00(ui; ul; S 0i; Sl) is also an eligible exchange pair,
thus violating the construction principle of E. Based on the denition of eligible
exchange pair, we know that
G(ui; E
0) = V (S 0l)  V (S 0i) = G(ul; E 0)
Since G(ui; E) is the maximal gain of ui on any exchange pair, it is easy to
verify that V (Sl)  V (S 0l)  V (S 0i). On the other hand, it can be derived that
V (Sl)   1V (Si)   1V (S 0i)
Combining the inequalities, we conclude E 00 = (ui; ul; S 0i; Sl) is also eligible.
Moreover, G(ui; E
00) = V (Sl) = G(ui; E) and G(ul; E 00) = V (S 0i) > V (Si) =
G(ul; E), which also violate our construction method. This contradiction leads
to the correctness of the lemma.
The lemma suggests the existence of an optimal exchange solution between ui
and ul for both parties, denoted by E
(ui; ul). However, for each user ui, there
may exist dierent eligible exchange pairs with dierent users at the same time.
To suggest more promising exchange pairs to the users, we dene Top-K Exchange
Pair as below.
Denition 3.2. Top-K Exchange Recommendations
For user ui, the top-k exchange pairs, i.e. Top(k; i), includes the k most valued
exchange pairs E(ui; ul) with k dierent users.
In the denition above, each pair of user (ui; ul) contributes at most one ex-
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Figure 3.1: Running Example of Top-K Exchange Pair Monitoring with  = 0:8
tween two users ui and ul. Therefore, it is less meaningful to output two dierent
exchange suggestions between a single pair of users. The main problem we want to
solve in this thesis is to provide an ecient mechanism to monitor top-k exchange
recommendations for each user in real time.
Problem 3.1. Top-K Exchange Pair Monitoring
For each insertion or deletion on any item list Li and Wi for user ui, update the
Top(k; j) for every user uj in the system.
Upon insertions or deletions on the item lists of user ui, the top-k exchange
pairs of ui or other users is subject to change. Figure 3.1 shows an example to help
understand the impact of item updates. At the initial timestamp, there is only
one eligible exchange pair between u2 and u3, i.e. (u2; u3; fI6g; fI4; I5g). The gain
of u3 in this potential exchange is 180$. At the second timestamp, assume that
no exchange is happened and a new item I3 is inserted into u1's wish list. The
exchange pair between u1 and u3 becomes eligible, as is listed in the table. The
gain of u3 from the new exchanging pair is $80, which is smaller than her gain from
the previous exchange suggestion with u2. As a result, the new exchanging pair is
the second best recommendation for u3. At time 3, I5 is deleted from unneeded
list of u2. This breaks the existing eligible exchang pair between u2 and u3, and
there is no other eligible exchange pairs between them. Therefore, this exchange
pair is deleted from the recommendation list of both users. It is important to note
that our system only presents the suggestions to the users, but never automatically
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commits these exchanges.
In the following theorem, we prove that the computation of top-1 exchange pair
is NP-hard, even when there are only two users in the system.
Theorem 3.1. Given two users ui and ul, nding the optimal eligible exchange
pair between ui and ul is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce the Load Balancing Problem to our problem. Given a group of
integers X = fx1; x2; : : : ; xng, the problem of load balancing is deciding if there
exists a partition X1  X and X2  X (X1 \ X2 = ; and X1 [ X2 = X) thatP
xi2X1 xi =
P
xj2X2 xj. Load balancing problem is one of the most famous NP-
Complete problems [52].
Given each instance of load balancing problem, i.e. X, we construct the item
lists for ui and ul as follows. For each xj 2 X, a corresponding item Ij is constructed
with value vj = xj. All these items Ij (1  j  n) are inserted into the wish item
list Wi for ui and unneeded item list Lj. A new item In+1 is then created with
value vn+1 =
P
xj2X xj=2. We insert In+1 into Li and Wj. This reduction can be
nished in O(n) time. By setting  = 0, our problem tries to nd a subset in Wi
with the exact total value as In+1. If such a solution is always discovered by some
algorithm in polynomial time, load balancing problem is also solvable in polynomial
time. If this is the case, we will prove P=NP because load balancing problem is
NP-Complete. Therefore, our problem is NP-Hard.
The last theorem shows that the complexity of nding top-k exchange pair be-
tween any two users is exponential to the size of the item lists. Fortunately, the
number of items owned by the users is usually limited in most of the online com-
munity systems. This partially relieves the problem of optimal exchange pairing.
Therefore, the major problem to overcome for top-k exchange pair monitoring is
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Notation Description
U = fuig the set of users in the community
O = fIjg the set of items with all users
Li the unneeded item list for user ui
Wi the wish list for user ui
vj the value of the item Ij
V (O0) the value of an item set O0  O
Si Sl item subset of Li and Ll respectively
E(ui; ul; Si; Sl) exchange pair between ui and ul
G(E; ui) the gain of ui from exchange E
 relaxation factor on value matching condition
E(ui; ul) the optimal exchange pair between ui and ul
AV T approximate value table
AV T [m] mth entry in AV T
N maximal number of items in any list
 approximation bound
vmin; vmax minimal and maximal value of any item combination
N maximal number of entries in any AV T
Top(k; i) Top-k exchanges list for user ui
i minimal value of exchange pairs in Top(k; i)
UL(Ij) set of users who have Ij in their unneeded item list
CL(Ij) set of users who have Ij in their critical item set
 number of top results to be calculated initially
i number of top results ui currently keep
Ki critical item sets for user ui
Table 3.1: Table of Notations
how to eectively select some pairs of users to re-calculate the optimal exchange,
when some insertion or deletion occurs. In the rest of the thesis, we present our
data structure for indexing the possible exchange pairs, in the presence of frequent
list updates.
3.2 Notations
For ease of reading, all of the notations are summarized in Table 3.1.
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3.3 Summary
In this chapter, BVEM, a model taking care of both item combination and price,
is adopted as the underlying exchange model. Based on this model, the Top-K
Exchange Recommendation is dened, which recommend users the best valued
exchange pairs with respect to exchange eligibility. To compute and maintain the
Top-K Exchange Recommendation in a real-time scenario, the Top-K Exchange




In this chapter, we present our solution to the Top-k Exchange Pair Monitoring
problem. We solve this problem in two steps: 1) we solve the T1U2 exchange
problem, which is a special case in which only exchange pair between two users are
computed; 2) we solve the general problem, based on our T1U2 exchange algorithm.
4.1 Exchange between Two Users
In this section, we focus on a special case of the exchange recommendation problem,
with only two users in the system are looking for the best valued exchange pair
between them. Later we will extend our discussion to the general case with arbitrary
number of users. For simplicity, we call it a T1U2 Exchange. Algorithmically, T1U2
exchange can be solved by an oine algorithm with exponential complexity in term
of the list sizes.
The oine algorithm works as follows. It rst computes the intersections be-
tween the wish list and unneeded item list, i.e Wi \ Ll and Li \Wl. Then all the
subsets of the two temporary lists are enumerated. The algorithm tests every pair
of the subsets to nd the pairing satisfying Denition 3.1 and maximizing the gain
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Algorithm 4 Brute-force algorithm for T1U2 exchange(Li;Wi; Ll;Wl)
1: Clear optimal solutions S
2: Generate subsets L = 2
Li\Wl and sort on value
3: Generate subsets R = 2
Ll\Wi and sort on value
4: Set m = jRj
5: for n from jLj to 1 do
6: while m > 0 and   jR[m]j > jL[n]j do
7: m = m  1
8: end while
9: if L[n] and R[m] is an eligible exchange then





of both users. Details about this algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 4. The run-
ning time of this algorithm is exponential to the list size, i.e. O(jSij2jSij+ jSlj2jSlj).
Unfortunately, there does not exist any exact algorithm with polynomial complex-
ity, unless P=NP. Hence it is more interesting to nd some alternative solution,
outputting approximate results with much better eciency.
Denition 4.1. -Approximate T1U2 Exchange for ui
Assuming E = (ui; ul; Si; Sl) is the highest valued exchange pair between user ui
and ul, an exchange pair, E
0 = (ui; ul; S 0i; S
0
l), is said to be -approximate for ui if
the gain is no worse than E by factor 1  , i.e. G(E 0; ui)  (1  )G(E; ui).
Unlike exact top-1 exchange pairing, -approximate exchange does not exhibit
similar property as in Lemma 3.1. An -approximate exchange pair for ui may
not be -approximate for ul. Therefore, the computation involving ui and uj may
return dierent results to the users.
Inspired by the famous polynomial-time approximation algorithm on the subset
sum problem [23], we design a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme(FPTAS)
to calculate -approximate T1U2 exchange. Moreover, we show how to utilize the
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solution to design a reusable index structure to support updates.
The approximation scheme follows similar idea in the FPTAS on subset sum
problem. Generally speaking, the original brute-force algorithm spends most of
the time on generating all the item combinations of Wi \ Ll and Li \Wl. There
are many redundant combinations, which share almost the same value with others.
In the new algorithm, it only generates some of the combinations of the items in
Wi \ Lj and Li \Wj. These combinations are maintained in a table indexed by
their approximate values. Other item combinations are merged into the table when
their value is similar to the existing ones. In particular, given the approximation
factor , the exact value of an item set, V (O0), is transformed to some approximate
value, (O0), guaranteeing that
V (O0)  (O0)  (1  ) 1V (O0) (4.1)
We hereby utilize the following rounding function f(x). Here, vmax and vmin are
the maximal/minimal values of any item combination,  is error tolerance and N
is the maximal number of items.
f(O0) =
&











 V (O0). Since vmin  V (O0)  vmax and f(O0) always outputs an integer, f(O0)
can only be a non-negative integer between 0 andN = d(log vmin log vmax)= log(1 

N
)e. Based on this property, we implicitly merge the item combinations to N
groups, i.e. fS1; S2; : : : ; SNg. Each group Sm contains every item combination O0
with f(O0) = m, i.e. Sm = fO0jf(O0) = mg. For every item combination O0 2 Sm,






which satises Equation (4.1).
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Algorithm 5 AV T Generation (Item set O0, Error bound  , maximal value
vmax, minimal value vmin, maximal item number N)
1: Generate an empty approximate value table AV T
2: Create a new entry AV T [0]
3: Set AV T [0]:lbi = ;
4: Set AV T [0]:ubi = ;
5: Set AV T [0]:value = 0
6: Set AV T [0]:lb = AV T [0]:ub = 0
7: for each item Ij 2 O0 do
8: for each entry AV T [m] 2 AV T do
9: Calculate M = f(AV T [m]:value+ vj)
10: if there is AV T [n]:value =M then
11: if AV T [m]:lb+ vj < AV T [n]:lb then
12: Update AV T [n]:lb and AV T [n]:lbi
13: end if
14: if AV T [m]:ub+ vj > AV T [n]:ub then
15: Update AV T [n]:ub and AV T [n]:ubi
16: end if
17: else
18: Create a new entry AV T [n] in AV T
19: AV T [n]:value =M
20: AV T [n]:lb = AV T [m]:lb+ vj
21: AV T [n]:ub = AV T [m]:ub+ vj
22: AV T [n]:lbi = AV T [m]:lbi [ fIjg




27: Return AV T
These groups are maintained in a relational table, called Approximate Value
Table (or AV T in short). In AV T , each entry AV T [m] records some statistical
information of the group Sm, to facilitate the computation of -approximate T1U2
exchange. Specically, we use AV T [m]:value to denote the common approximate
value of all item combinations in Sm. We use AV T [m]:lb (AV T [m]:ub resp.) to
denote the lower bound (upper bound resp.) of all the item combinations in Sm.
We also keep the item combinations achieving the lower bound and upper bound,
i.e. AV T [m]:lbi and AV T [m]:ubi. In Table 4.1, we present an example of AV T .
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Entry approximate value lb lbi ub ubi All item combinations
AV T [1] 2 2 fI1g 2 fI1g fI1g,fI2g
AV T [2] 4 3 fI3g 4 fI1; I2g fI3g,fI1; I2g
AV T [3] 8 5 fI1; I3g 7 fI1; I2; I3g fI1; I3g,fI2; I3g,fI1; I2; I3g
Table 4.1: Example of approximate value table on a 3-item set
To construct the AV T table, we sort all items based on their identiers. At
the beginning, the algorithm initializes the rst entry AV T [0] in the table. We set
AV T [0]:value = AV T [0]:lb = AV T [0]:ub = 0, empty AV T [0]:lbi and AV T [0]:ubi
at the same time. For each item Ij in the input item set O
0, the algorithm iterates
every through existing entry AV T [m] in the AV T and updates as follows. For
every entry AV T [m], our algorithm tries to generate a new entry AV T [n] with
n = f(AV T [m]:value + vj). If AV T [n] already exists, it tries to merge Ij into
AV T [m]:lbi and AV T [m]:ubi, checking if they can generate new lower and upper
bound for group Sn. If AV T [n] does not exist in the table, a new entry is created.
The details are available in Algorithm 5.
If we run the algorithm on a 3-item set O0 = fI1; I2; I3g with item prices v1 = 2,
v2 = 2 and v3 = 3, the result AV T is presented in Table 4.1, with (1  =N) 1 = 2
and vmin = 1. There are 7 non-empty combinations in O
0, including fI1g, fI2g,
fI3g, fI1; I2g, fI1; I3g, fI2; I3g and fI1; I2; I3g. After nishing the construction of
the AV T table, there are only 3 entries in the table, which is much smaller than
than the original number of item combinations. The information of the groups are
all listed in the rows of the table. We also include the concrete item combinations
in the last column for better elaboration, although AV T does not maintain them
in the computation.
In the following lemma, we show that the output AV T summarizes every item
combination within error bound .
Lemma 4.1. Given any item set O0, for each item combination O00  O0, the AV T
table calculated by Algorithm 5 contains at least one entry AV T [m] that
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V (O00)  (1  )AV T [m]:value
AV T [m]:lb  V (O00)  AV T [m]:ub
Proof. For simplicity, let  = 1  =N . We apply mathematical induction to that,
8O00 2 O0, there is an AV T [n] such that:
V (O00)  jO00jAV T [m]:value (4.3)
AV T [m]:lb  V (O00)  AV T [m]:ub (4.4)
Basically, if jO00j = 0, namely O00 = ;, the Equation 4.3 and 4.4 hold by giving
AV T [0].
Then we inductively prove the lemma. Assume that the the Equation 4.3 and 4.4
hold for all jO000j = k, we are going to prove that they also hold for O00 with length
k + 1. Let O00 = fI1; I2; : : : ; Ik+1g. By the assumption, for O000 = fI1; I2; : : : ; Ikg,
there is a AV T [n] such that Equation 4.3 and 4.4 holds. According to line 9-12
in Algorithm 5, the AVT table is updated according to Ik+1 and AV T [n]. Let the
updated (line 11-14) or new created (line 16-21) AVT entry be AV T [m]. We can
verify that:
48
V (O00) = V (O00   Ik+1) + vk+1
 kAV T [n]:value+ vk+1
 k(AV T [n]:value+ vk+1)
 k+1f(AV T [n]:value+ vk+1)
= k+1AV T [m]:value
V (O00) = V (O00   Ik+1) + vk+1
 AV T [n]:lb+ vk+1
 AV T [m]:lb
V (O00) = V (O00   Ik+1) + vk+1
 AV T [n]:ub+ vk+1
 AV T [m]:ub
Since k  N = (1  =N)N  1  , Lemma 4.1 holds.
The size of AV T is no larger than N . Therefore, the complexity of the AV T
construction algorithm is O(N 2jO0j). Assuming vmax, vmin,  and N are all known
constants, the algorithm nishes in linear time with respect to the item size jO0j,
which is supposed to be much faster than the exact algorithm if N is much smaller
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than 2jN j.
To utilize AV T in T1U2 exchange problem, we create two tables AV T1 and
AV T2, based on Li \Wl and Wi \ Ll respectively. If there is an eligible exchange
pair between ui and ul, the following lemma shows that there must also exist a pair
of AV T [m] 2 AV T1 and AV T [n] 2 AV T2 with close values.
Lemma 4.2. If E = (ui; ul; Si; Sl) is any eligible exchange and   1   , there
exists two entries AV T1[m] 2 AV T1 and AV T2[n] 2 AV T2 that
AV T1[m]:lb  AV T2[n]:ub   1AV T1[m]:lb
AV T2[n]:lb  AV T1[m]:ub   1AV T2[n]:lb
Proof. According to Lemma 4.1, we can nd AV T1[m] and AV T2[n] such that
AV T1[m]:lb  V (Si)  AV T1[m]:ub, and AV T2[n]:lb  V (Sl)  AV T2[n]:ub.
There could be two cases:
 AV T1[m]:value  AV T2[n]:value
 AV T1[m]:value < AV T2[n]:value
These two cases correspond to the two inequalities respectively. We will only
prove the rst case because of the symmetry.
The left side of the inequations:




The right side of the inequations:
AV T2[n]:ub  AV T2[n]:value
 AV T1[m]:value
 (1  ) 1AV T1[m]:lb
  1AV T1[m]:lb
So far the rst case has been proven. The second case can be proven similarly.
The last lemma shows that we can nd candidate pairs from the approximate
value tables, by testing the lower bounds and upper bounds of the entries. Based on
the lemma, we present algorithm 6 to show how to discover -approximate exchange
pair for ui and ul at the same time. Note that the results for ui and ul may not be
the same exchange pair. Given the AV T1 on Wi \ Ll and AV T2 on Li \Wl, every
pair of entries AV T [m] 2 AV T1 and AV T [n] 2 AV T2 are tested. If the condition
in Lemma 4.2 is satised, two pairs of eligible exchange pair are generated, i.e. an
exchange candidate (ui; ul; AV T [m]:ubi; AV T [n]:lbi) for ui and another exchange
candidate (ui; ul; AV T [m]:lbi; AV T [n]:ubi) for ul respectively. The algorithm then
tests the optimality of the two exchange pairs for ui and ul separately. After
nding all the eligible exchange pairs, the optimal solutions are returned to ui and
ul separately.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 6 outputs -approximate optimal top-k exchange pair
between any two users ui and ul in linear time.
Proof. Consider the top-1 eligible exchange (ui; ul; Si; Sl). By Lemma 4.2, we can
nd an upper (lower) bound item set S 0i in AV T1, and an lower (upper, resp.)




Algorithm 6 Exchange Search on AV T ( lists Wi, Li, Wl, Ll)
1: Clear result set RSi for ui and RSl for ul
2: Generate AV T1 on Wi \ Ll and AV T2 on Li \Wl
3: for each pair of entries AV T1[m] 2 AV T1 and AV T2[n] 2 AV T2 do









5: Generate (ui; ul; AV T [m]:ubi; AV T [n]:lbi) for ui and
(ui; ul; AV T [m]:lbi; AV T [n]:ubi) for ul
6: Update RSi and RSl if necessary
7: end if
8: end for
9: Return RSi to ui and RSl to ul
(1   )V (Si), V (S 0l)  (1   )V (Sl). Therefore, (ui; ul; S 0i; S 0l) is an -approximate
top-1 exchange pair. Since both S 0i and S
0
l are lower or upper bound item sets,
and Algorithm 6 compares all pairs of lower / upper bound values, S 0i and S
0
j are
guaranteed to be found by Algorithm 6.
The algorithm to nd approximate T1U2 is described in Algorithm 6. Since
there are at most N entries in either table, the time complexity of Algorithm 6 is
O(N 2). By sorting all the entries in decreasing order on approximate value and
scanning entries in top-down fashion, we can easily reduce the complexity of the
algorithm to O(N ).
4.2 General Top-K Exchange
In last section, we use the technique of approximate value table to search top-1
exchange pair between two users ui and ul. In real systems, however, there are
usually thousands of users online at the same time. To support large community
systems for exchange recommendation, we extend our discussion from two users to
arbitrary number of users in this section. A straightforward solution to the problem
is maintaining jU j(jU j   1) approximate value tables. For each pair of users ui and
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ul, two approximate value tables AV Til and AV Tli are constructed and maintained
for item combinations in Wi \ Ll and Li \Wl respectively. Upon any update of
the lists with user ui, the system re-computes T1U2 between ui and any other user
ul. Top(k; i) and Top(k; l) are thus updated accordingly with respect to the new
optimal exchange between ui and ul. Unfortunately, this solution is not scalable
in large online community systems on table indexing and maintenance, due to the
quadratic number of tables used in this solution.
To reduce the memory space used by the index structure, we do not dynamically
maintain approximate value tables between every pair of users. Instead, some
lightweight index structure is kept in the system, with space consumption linear
to the number of items. Given an update on some list Li (or Wi) on user ui, this
data structure is used to nd out every user ul with potentially aected Top(k; i)
or Top(k; l). To accomplish this, we rst derive some necessary condition on top-k
exchange pairs, with the concept of Critical Item Set.
Denition 4.2. Given an item list Wi of user ui, a subset of items O
0  Wi form
a critical item set, if V (Wi)  V (O0) < G(ui; T op(k; i)).
In other words, an item set O0 is critical to the wish list Wi, if the rest of the
items in Wi is of total value no larger than the current optimal gain of ui. In the
following, we useKi to denote the critical item set onWi of ui. Note that Denition
4.2 only provides an sucient condition on critical item set. Given an item list Wi,
there can be hundreds of dierent combinations of items satisfying the denition
above. In Section 4.2.1, we will discuss more on how to construct a good critical
item set according to some criterion.
Lemma 4.3. If Top(k; i) contains an exchange pair
E = (ui; ul; Si; Sl), Si contains at least one item Ij in the critical item set Ki with
respect to Wi.
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Proof. Suppose that Si does not contains any item in Ki. That is, Si  Wi  
Ki. Therefore, V (Si)  V (Wi)   V (Ki) < G(ui; T op(k; i)). This contradicts the
condition that Si is an top-k exchange. Therefore, Si contains at least one item in
any critical item set.
Lemma 4.3 implies that the system needs to re-compute the T1U2 exchange
between ui and ul to update Top(k; i), only if ul owns at least one critical item of
ui and vice versa. This motivates our index structure based on inverted lists on the
critical items. There are two inverted lists on each item, i.e. CL(Ij) and UL(Ij).
CL(Ij) consists of a list of users with Ij in his critical item set, and UL(Ij) includes
all users with Ij in his unneeded item list.
Generally speaking, when there is an update (insertion or deletion) onWi of user
ui, the system retrieves a group of candidate users from the inverted lists and com-







The detailed description is given in Algorithm 7. By Lemma 4.3, this algorithm
does not miss any necessary update on the top recommendation lists. The major
cost of the candidate selection is spent on merging the inverted lists on the users.
To improve the eciency of the list merging, every inverted list is sorted on the ids
of the users. In the rest of the section, we discuss details on the implementations
of some more ecient pruning strategies.
4.2.1 Critical Item Selection
In this part of the section, we resolve the problem on the construction of optimal
critical item selection according to Algorithm 7. Given the wish list Wi, there are
a large number of dierent ways to construct the critical item set Ki. Generally
speaking, a good critical item set is supposed to reduce the number of candidate
users tested in Algorithm 7. To accomplish this, we rst derive some cost model
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Algorithm 7 General Top-K Update(Wi,ui)
1: Clear the left candidate user set CUl
2: for each Ij in the critical item set of Wi do
3: merge UL(Ij) into CUl
4: end for
5: Clear the right candidate user set CUr
6: for each Ij 2 Li do
7: merge CL(Ij) into CUr
8: end for
9: for each ul 2 CUl \ CUr do
10: Compute T1U2 between ui and ul
11: Update Top(k; i) and Top(k; l) accordingly
12: end for
below.
Since UL(Ij) keeps the set of users owning the item Ij in their unneeded item
list. Basically, we assume that jUL(Ij)j is relatively small, compared to the total
number of users jU j, i.e. jUL(Ij)j  jU j. Moreover, we further assume that UL(Ij)
for dierent items are not strongly correlated. Namely, for any two distinct items
Ij and Ik, jUL(Ij) \ UL(Ik)j  jUL(Ij)j. With this assumption, the number
of candidate users to check, given the critical item set Ki, can be estimated byP
Ij2Ki jUL(Ij)j.
Based on the analysis above, a good critical item set is equal to the following








vj  V (Wi) G(ui; T op(k; i))
That is, for an user Ui, we select a set Ki  Wi, to minimize
P
Ij2K jUL(Ij)j,
subject to the sucient condition
P
Ij2K vj  V (Wi) G(ui; T op(k; i)) in Denition
4.2.
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User Wi Li G(ui; T op(k; i)) Critical Item Set
u1 I1, I2, I3 I4, I5, I6 60 I1, I2
u2 I2, I6 I3, I5 50 I6
u3 I3, I5 I1, I2, I6 80 I5
u4 I1, I4 I6 0 I1, I4
u5 I4, I6 I1, I3 10 I4, I6
Table 4.2: Example of critical item sets of 5 users
Although this problem is an NP-Complete problem, a near-optimal solution can
be obtained by a simple greedy algorithm. Following such construction method,
the items in Wi are sorted in decreasing order of vj=jUL(Ij)j. Then the items
are selected one by one in this order, until the sum of the value exceeds V (Wi)  
G(ui; T op(k; i)).
Table 4.2 shows an example of system with 5 users. The value of the items are
v1 = 70; v2 = 40; v3 = 20; v4 = 35; v5 = 80; v6 = 10, and jUL(I1)j = 3; jUL(I2)j =
1; jUL(I3)j = 2; jUL(I4)j = 1; jUL(I5)j = 2; jUL(I6)j = 3. u1 has 3 items in Wi,
and the critical item set is I1 and I2, which has a total value of 110 > v1 + v2 +
v3 G(u1; T op(k; 1)) = 70, and sum of UL(I1)+UL(I2) = 4. Other eligible critical
item sets include fI1; I3g and fI1; I2; I3g. By sorting the item on vj=UL(Ij), we
pick up the items in order fI2; I1; I3g. The nal critical item set is Ki = fI1; I2g.
4.2.2 Item Insertion
When an item insertion occurs, the system retrieves all candidate users with some
pruning condition, and re-computes the T1U2 exchange to update the top-k rec-
ommendations.
After a new item Ij is inserted into the wish list Wi of an user ui, some new
eligible exchange pairs are generated. If there is a new eligible exchange between
user ul and ui, ul must own this item in its unneeded item list Li. Otherwise, this
exchange pair must be tested before. Hence the candidate user set CU is initialized
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with the inverted list UL(Ij). Then for each user ul in CU , the system examines
if ui owns a critical item of ul or ul owns a critical item of ui. If any of these two
cases happens, Algorithm 6 is invoked to nd the optimal exchange pair between
ui and ul.
We give an additional example of item insertion. In the example illustrated in
Table 4.2, if one new item I1 is inserted into u2's wish list W2, the system rst
retrieves the users owning I1 in their unneeded item lists. Such users include u3
and u5. The system then tests if these candidate users have at least one critical
item of u2. Since u5 does not contain any u2's critical items fI6g, and u2 does not
contain any u5's critical items fI4; I6g in the unneeded item list. Therefore, u5 fails
the test and u3 will be further checked by the 2-user item exchange algorithm.
4.2.3 Item Deletion
When removing some Ij from Wi, the deletion operation can be done in two steps.
In the rst step, the system deletes all the current top-k exchanges containing the
deleted item. In the second step, some re-computation is run to nd new top-k
exchange pairs for users with insucient exchange recommendations.
The rst step in the deletion operation is implemented with some inverted list
structure, allowing the system to quickly locate all top-k exchange pairs with the
deleted item Ij in Wi. Assume that the users with deleted exchange pairs are all
kept in a \to-be-updated" user list. Algorithm 7 is then called for each user in
the list, to x all the top-k recommendation pairs. This implies that the deletion
operation is expensive if many users are added into the \to-be-updated" user list.
To optimize the system performance, we propose some optimization technique
possibly reducing the number of users in the \to-be-updated" user list after the
deletion operation. The basic idea of the optimization is maintaining top  ex-
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change pairs for each user ui, with some integer  > k. It is straightforward to
verify that Top(k; i) is subset of Top(; i). To utilize the expanded top exchange
recommendation set, the system updates Top(; i) for each insertion operation.
On item deletion, if one of the exchange pair E 2 Top(; l) is removed due to the
deletion of Ij 2 Wi, the exchange list will not be totally re-computed immediately.
Instead, the new T1U2 exchange between ui and ul is evaluated. If the new op-
timal exchange on ui and ul remains in Top(; l), it is directly inserted back into
Top(; l). Otherwise, the counter decreases by one from  to   1. The complete
re-computation of Top(; l) is delayed until the next insertion operation on lists
of ul or there is less than k exchange pairs left with the system. We can prove
that the all exchange pairs in Top(k; i) must be exactly maintained by the scheme.
Although it incurs more cost on insertions (because of the larger critical item set),
this optimization greatly improves the overall performance of the system by cutting
unnecessary re-computation of top exchange pairs.
We give an additional example of item deletion. Assume that k = 2 and  =
3. At rst, one user u1 has 3 top exchanges: E1 = (u1; u3; fI1; I2g; fI5g), E2 =
(u1; u5; fI1g; fI4; I6g and E3 = (u1; u2; fI3g; fI6g). If I4 is deleted from L1, E2 is
removed from the list, and 1 become 2. Suppose then I6 is deleted, E3 is also
removed and 1 become 1. Then re-computing is triggered, and 1 is reset to 3,
with the top results list re-computed.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we rst designed an FPTAS to solve the two-user exchange algo-
rithm. This approximation algorithm successfully solve the NP-hard problem in
polynomial time with controllable approximation ratio. Then we propose a e-
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cient solution to the general Top-k Exchange Pair Monitoring problem, based on




In this chapter, we evaluate the algorithms we proposed in Chapter 4. We adapt
the real life data from B2B online market as well as generating synthetic data based
on some general models.
5.1 Data Generation and Experiment Settings
5.1.1 Synthetic Dataset
The rst step of synthetic data generation is creating certain number of items.
Each item is assigned with a value. Values are generated according to certain
distributions, including exponential and Zipf distributions. The parameters of all
the distributions in being investigated are provided in Table 5.1. The maximum
value and minimum value are set at 10,000 and 10 respectively. When generating
the item values, the distributions are truncated to keep all prices between 10 and
10,000.
In real system, users and their items are usually strongly correlated, because of
the similar tastes and behaviors. To capture the diversity and clustering properties
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Distribution Density Function p(x) Parameter





s = 1, N = Vmax
Table 5.1: Parameters controlling the distributions on values
on the users and items, we setup 5 classes to model dierent types of users and their
preferred items. Each user is randomly assigned to one of the classes with equal
probability. One of the class is considered as \background class", which contains
all the items. Every item is also assigned to one of the other four classes with equal
probability. There is an upper limit on the maximum number of items in each list
N . An item list, e.g. wish list Wi or unneeded item list Li, is full if the number
of items reaches the limitation. In our experiments, to test the scalability of the
system, we try to keep the item list as full as possible.
After setting the parameters and assigning users and items to the classes, the
synthetic data are generated with a sequence of item updates. The generation
of updates consists of two phases. The rst phase is the warm-up phase. The
objective of this phase is to ll each user's wish and unneeded item lists, thereby
with more insertions than deletions. After the lists are almost full, the second
phase of simulation is started. In this phase, insertions and deletions take place
with identical frequency, leading to relatively stable system workload.
In the rst phase, when generating a new update, our simulation randomly
selects a user with equal probability. The generator then chooses one of the wish
list or the unneeded item list. If the target list is not full, an insertion operation is
taken. Otherwise, the generator randomly deletes one of the item in the target list.
During insertion, the selection on the inserting item depends on the user's class
as well as the items' class. The generator picks up a random number to decide
if the item is from the same class of the user (4=7 probability), the \background"
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class (2=7 probability) or the other three classes (1=7 probability, and 1=21 for each
class). It then uniformly chooses an item from the specic class. During deletion,
one item is chosen from the list with equal probability. The selection of the deleting
item does not take class information into account.
In the second phase, similar to the rst phase, one item list from the chosen user
is selected with equal probability. If the selected item list is empty, an insertion to
the item list is done. If the item list is neither full nor empty, the generator makes
a random decision: it generates an insertion with probability 0.6, or a deletion with
probability 0.4. The selected probabilities are able to keep all lists almost full in
the second phase.
The number of updates generated in the rst phase is N  jU j, where jU j is the
number of users and N is the maximal number of items in any list. The number of
updates generated in the second phase is no less than 2N  jU j. The performance


























Figure 5.1: Average update response time over time
In Figure 5.1, we present the change in average update response time during
our simulation. In the rst phase of the simulation, the response time increases
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(d) Dist. on total value of item list intersec-
tions
Figure 5.2: Distribution on length and total value of user item lists and intersections
All our experimental results are collected in the second phase of the simulation.
The Figure 5.2 illustrates the distribution of the item after a period of running
and the system performance has been stabilized. The number of users in the system
is 30,000 and the length of item list is limited to 15. Figure 5.2(a) represents the
distribution of item length of each user. As we can see in the gure, the majority
of users have an item list that is almost full. More than 80% users' item lists are
of length 13, 14 or 15. Figure 5.2(b) illustrates the distribution on total value
of each user's item list. As shown in the gure, the total value is concentrated
around 15k~20k. Figure 5.2(c) shows the distribution on the length of the item list
intersections, which is the number of common items between two users. It can be
seen that users tend to have very small number of intersections. In most of the
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cases, it is no more than 5 items. The same trend can be seen in Figure 5.2(d),
which plots the distribution of intersection value between users. Among all jU j2
pairs of users, only a several hundred user pairs share items with more than 20k
total value.
Table 5.2 summarizes the parameters tested in our experiments. Their default
values are in bold font.
Parameter Varying Range
Number of users 10k; 20k;30k; 40k; 50k
 0:7; 0:75;0.8; 0:85; 0:9; 0:95
Length of item list 10; 15;20; 25; 30
 15; 25;35; 45; 55; 65; 75
k 1; 3;5; 7; 9; 11
Number of items 300; 600; 900; 1200;1500
 1  
Table 5.2: Varying parameters in synthetic data set
5.1.2 Real Dataset
It is dicult to nd real exchanging data from large online communities. To get a
better understanding on our method with real world applications, we crawl some
transaction data from eBay.com, which is a famous C2C online market system.
Our crawler records historical transactions with certain users in consecutive 90
days. Afterwards, all the users participating in these transactions are crawled in
the same manner. In total we have crawled 34,191 users, 452,774 item records and
1,094,152 transaction records. We associate a user's wish (unneeded) list with all
the item that he/she buys (sells).
64
As an online market is dierent from an exchanging market, we pre-process the
data in order to make it suitable to test our system. We nd that there are large
number of duplicated or highly similar items. In order to reduce the duplication and
increase the overlapping between user item lists, highly similar items are merged
together. Some items and users are discarded to make sure that every user has
non-empty item list. After the pre-processing, the nal result data contains 2,458
users and 2,769 items.
To test our system performance under dierent number of users, we re-scale the
data to generate data set of various size. To scale up the data, we randomly dupli-
cate existing users until reaching the desired size. The duplicated user associates
with the same set of items. To scale down the data, we randomly remove users.
We generate continuous updates according to the transactions we have crawled.
We associate an item with a user's wish (unneeded) list, if this user have bought
(sold) this item. To generate update operations, we randomly choose a user, an
updating type (insertion/deltetion), an item list (wish/unneeded) and an item as-
sociated with this list.
The length of an item list at any moment is limited within 15. A list with
15 items are considered as full. The reason to set a xed limitation is that our
crawled transactions span 90 days. These items are not listed at the same time. At
any moment, only a small number of items are listed. Therefore, we set this xed
limitation to control the number of items simultaneously listed in an item list.
Table 5.3 summarizes the parameters tested in our real data experiments. Their
default values are in bold font.
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Parameter Varying Range
Number of users 0:5k; 1:5k;2.5k; 3:5k; 4:5k
 0:7; 0:75;0.8; 0:85; 0:9; 0:95
 15; 25;35; 45; 55; 65; 75
k 1; 3;5; 7; 9; 11
 1  
Table 5.3: Varying parameters in real data set
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Figure 5.3: Impact of varying item list length on running time
In Section 4.1 we propose Algorithm 6, which is an approximation algorithm for
nding T2U1 exchange. In this section, we evaluate its performance, including the
running time and the approximation ratio. Also we use the brute force algorithm as
straw-man. We test both algorithms on exponential and Zipf distribution. Detailed
density functions and parameters of them are as shown in 5.1.
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 present the performance of both algorithms under item lists
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(b) Approximation ratio on Zipf price distribu-
tion
Figure 5.4: Impact of varying item list length on approximation
of equal length, as Wi \ Ll and Li \ Wl. Figure 5.3 shows the running time of
both algorithms. As the plots shown, when the lengths of the item lists are less
than 8, approximation scheme is not as good as brute-force algorithm, because
approximation method spends too much time on index construction. However, as
the size of the item set grows, the running time of brute force algorithm grows ex-
ponentially, while the approximate algorithm shows a good scalability. Figure 5.4
represents the approximation ratio of the approximate T1U2 algorithm on various
value distributions. The approximation ratio is dened as the proportion of the
approximated result to the accurate result, i.e. the output of the brute force algo-
rithm. The results show that under either value distribution, the approximation
ratio is no smaller than 0.99.
Figure 5.5 discusses the eect of relaxation ratio  on the running time of both
algorithms, when the number of items are xed at 10. We set  for Algorithm 6
at 1   . The running time of Algorithm 6 increase with , which well follows
the complexity analysis. On the other hand,  does not aect the running time
of brute-force method. Figure 5.6 shows that the actual approximation ratio in
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(b) Approximation ratio on Zipf price distribu-
tion
Figure 5.6: Impact of varying  on approximate rate
5.3 Top-K Monitoring on Synthetic Dataset
We compare our proposed algorithm with critical item pruning, referred to as `Crit-
ical', with a basic algorithm, referred to as `Basic'. The basic algorithm is similar
to our proposed method. It nds the exchange candidates with the inverted list.
However, it does not apply critical item pruning strategy. After exchange candi-
dates are found, the algorithm simply nd eligible exchange pairs between current
user and each candidate using the T1U2 algorithm.
To verify the eciency, we measure the response time. Only the experiment
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results on exponential distribution are summarized, because there is no signicant
dierences among results on various distributions. For each set of experiments,
a query le is generated according to the rule we describe in Section 5.1. The
query le contains 10 to 30 million updates and is long enough to makes sure that
the system nally levels o. The average response time is measured every 1,000
continuous operations. The aim of our experiments is to test the impact of system
parameters, the item price distributions and the user number.
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, to optimize the performance, the system initially
computes the top  results instead of k, where  > k. When one of the old top-k
exchanges is deleted, top- results are calculated instead of re-computing only top-
k results. We rst test the impact of the number . The empirical result is also
used to justify our selection of the default value for  in Table 5.2.
The selection of  aects the system performance on two sides. On the one
hand, large  decreases the frequency of re-computing. On the other hand, it
increases the update cost. Figure 5.7(a) illustrates the system response time when
varying , when k is set as default value 5. The result shows that the response
time reduces when  increases. The optimal performance is achieved when  = 35
for both algorithms. When  keeps increasing, the system performance levels o,
because of the increasing cost of updates.
Then we study the eect of k, i.e. the number of top exchange recommendations.
We record the system response time under dierent values of k. Figure 5.7(b) shows
that the overall response time slightly increases with the growth on k. However,
this minor increase makes no signicant impact on the overall performance. This
implies that the extra overhead brought by increasing k is not an important factor
for our system. For basic algorithm, it scans the list and nds the candidate
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Basic
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(f) Eect of total item number
Figure 5.7: Top-K monitoring results on synthetic dataset
although increasing k can result in a larger critical item set, the pruning result is
not signicantly increased. This suggests that our pruning method is eective in
reducing the candidate set size.
We next study the eect of relaxation factor  on the system performance. We
illustrate the response time under dierent  factor, as shown in Figure 5.7(c). The
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overall performance always holds on a certain level. This result implies that our
system can work well under dierent  values. Response time of basic algorithm
at  = 0:95 slightly decline in both data sets, since fewer eligible exchange can be



































































































(d) Eect of relaxation factor 
Figure 5.8: Top-K Monitoring Results on Real Life Dataset
In our experiments, each user's item list is length xed. It challenges the system
performance when each user is allowed to list more items. We hereby study the
performance on dierent lengthes of item lists. As shown in Figure 5.7(d), when
the item list grows larger, the response time grows linearly with N . When the
item list expands, items are more likely to appear in lists for dierent users. The
system has to examine more users to update the exchange recommendations. In
practice, users in online communities does not have a long item list. Therefore, the
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current performance of our system is capable of handling the workload of general
community systems.
Number of users in the system is another very important factor which greatly
impacts the system performance. We evaluate the response time under dierent
number of users. The result is presented in Figure 5.7(e). The result shows that
the response time linearly grows with the number of users. Despite the decline of
the system throughput, the performance of our method is still excellent even for
the largest u we have tested (more than 1,000 updates per second under 50,000
users).
According to our data generating method, when the number of total items
decreases, every item is shared by more users. This brings extra overhead to the
system. It is reected in our test of the system performance with varying number of
items. As shown in Figure 5.7(f), the system performance is inversely proportional
to the number of items.
5.4 Top-K Monitoring on Real Dataset
Similarly to the experiments in previous subsection, we compare \Critical" against
\Basic" on real dataset. Firstly, we study the eect of , which is the initial top
results that the system computes. In the tests, k is set at 5. The result is illustrated
in Figure 5.8(a). As can be seen in the gure, response time keeps decreasing with
 increases. For the Basic algorithm, the response time drops signicantly before
 = 45 and levels o after the point. The critical pruning algorithm is not greatly
aected by the . Its response time decrease insignicantly with  increases.
Secondly, we study the eect of k, which is the number of top results requested
by user. The result is illustrated as Figure 5.8(b).
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The result implies that our pruning strategy can well handle the increasing
number of k. For both algorithms, the response time linearly increases with k. The
critical algorithm increases slightly slower than the basic algorithm. The overall
eciency shows that our pruning strategy halves the response time. The improve-
ment is better, because in a real life data set, item price distribution is more skewed
and user-item ownership are more clustered.
Thirdly, we study the eect of u, which is the number of users participating
in the exchange. We test both algorithm under various number of users. As our
original (ltered) data set contains 2,458 users, we re-scale the data to generate
dierently sized data set. We down-scale the data set to generate u = 500 and
u = 1; 500 data sets. We up-scale the date to generate u = 2; 500, 3; 500 and 4; 500
data sets. The result is shown in Figure 5.8(c).
The result shows that the critical algorithm has a high eciency and nice s-
calability. It has an improvement up to near three times. When the user number
increases, the response time of critical algorithm grows in a linear manner. Mean-
while, response time of basic algorithm grows faster when user number exceed
2,500. This is because that on the one hand, when we up-scale the data, each item
is owned by more user, and the cost of searching for top-k exchange becomes more
expensive; on the other hand, each deleting eects more top-k results, which result
in a more frequent top-k re-computing. As a result, the basic algorithm shows a
super-linear increasing. Since the critical algorithm is less aected by re-computing
frequency, it shows a linear growth in response time.
Lastly, we study the eect of , which is the relaxation factor and also the
approximation factor in Algorithm 6. The result is illustrated as Figure 5.8(b).
The critical algorithm perform well under all , while the response time of the
basic algorithm keeps on increasing with . In a real-life data, user-item ownership
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are highly clustered. Therefore, small user group often shares a long common item
list. In this case, the approximate T1U2 algorithm is launched more frequently than
in our synthetic data set. As the approximation algorithm has an time complexity
related to (1  ) 1, the response time increase with .
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we empirically study our solution. We rst evaluate our approxi-
mation T1U2 algorithm with synthetic data. We compare our proposed algorithm
with brute-force under various item list length and . The results shows our approx-
imation algorithm can easily handle long item list without running time's explosive
growing. The actual approximation ratio is also much better than the theoretical
expectation.
We then study our general Top-k Recommendation Monitoring algorithm. Both
synthetic and real-life data set are used. We compare our algorithm with a basic
algorithm in which critical item selection is not used. We evaluate the impact of ,
k, , N , jU j and total item numbers on both algorithms. In all experiments, our
our algorithm over perform the basic algorithm. Moreover, the experiment results
show that our algorithm has a good scalability in terms of item list length, user




In this thesis, we study the problem of top-k exchange pair monitoring on large
online community system. We propose a new exchange model, Binary Value-based
Exchange Model (BVEM), which allows exchange transaction between users only
when they both have items the other side wants and the total values of the items
are of the same price. We present an ecient mechanism to nd the top-1 exchange
pair between two users, and extend the analysis to large system with arbitrarily
many users. Extensive experiments on synthetic data sets show that our solution
provides a scalable and eective solution to the problem.
As a future work, we are planning to extend our model by adding or relaxing
constraints in Denition 3.1. For example, the condition on exact item match
can be replaced by type match, allowing user to claim general type of item in
his/her wish list. Spatial constraint, as another example, can help the users to nd
the exchange opportunities more convenient to proceed. It is also interesting to
investigate the possibilities of new exchange models in the social networks, utilizing
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